Shiv M. Sahai Retd (IPS)
(Highlight: The unimaginable punishment that the Prime Minister has promised will come. It is evident from the statements of Pakistani ministers that they are bracing for calibrated Indian responses. What is clear is that the template has changed: it will not just be terror camps. The perpetrators and their masters will face multiple consequences. One lesson has already been delivered by the people of Kashmir themselves.)
India may finally have an opportunity to emotionally integrate the people of Kashmir. The state has struggled for several decades to remove the feeling of ‘otherness’ in Kashmir, employing many strategies—from Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad’s development agenda to Operation Sadhbhavnaof the Indian Army. Nothing has worked as well as this humongous tragedy. The outpouring of grief and support from local Kashmiris resonated with the anger and outrage demonstrated by the people of India after the Pahalgam attack.
Pakistan may have actually shot itself in the foot. This killing has ensured that no one in Kashmir now supports Pakistan. Such an impact of the Baisaran incident may not have been factored in by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan when they ordered the Lashkar-e-Taiba to carry out the massacre. Tourists have been targets before, but never on such a large scale. Beyond the economic impact, tourism had played an important role in emotionally integrating the people of Kashmir—a reason perhaps why tourists were targeted.
The Pakistani military has been struggling on several fronts, especially against the challenge from Imran Khan, the ousted former Prime Minister. After the reading down of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, they were seen as having done little for the people of Kashmir. Meanwhile, they are also facing insurgencies in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The strategic depth, which they believed they had secured after the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan, has dissipated; the Taliban, as expected, has not cracked down on the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).
Munir’s gambit
Faced with an imploding economy and a precarious security situation, the Pakistani middle class is becoming increasingly convinced that as long as the army controls the state, the situation will not improve. Gen. Asim Munir faces an existential threat of losing control over the Pakistani state. Despite the actions announced by India, memes originating from Pakistan are deeply critical of their own condition. Some even remark that they don’t get any water in any case so how will stopping the Indus waters makae a difference. One Kashmiri officer quipped that Asim Munir would not like to become the “Bahadur Shah Zafar” of the Pakistan Army.
Exacerbating this disillusionment in Pakistan is the belief that politicians like the Sharifs and the Bhuttos cannot control the military. Increasing global isolation is palpable; Pakistani nationals are becoming unwelcome in many Western countries. Moreover, the rising number of attacks on Pakistani security forces and civilians reinforces this belief.
Gen. Munir likely saw this as the ideal time to strike at the Indian state. The Vice President of the United States was visiting India, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi was in Saudi Arabia receiving unprecedented honour. The Waqf Bill was being debated, stirring anti-Muslim sentiments in some sections of Kashmir and elsewhere. The tourist season was peaking, and security in Kashmir appeared stable—a situation largely credited to strong measures by the Indian government. The handling of Jammu and Kashmir has earned the central government high approval, especially useful as the ruling party prepares for elections in Bihar. Thus, it seemed like the perfect time for an attack.
Munir could project the attack as retaliation for the BLA’s attack on a train in Balochistan. He could undermine India’s claims of stability in Kashmir post-Article 370. The killing of Hindu tourists could spark a communal backlash in India, causing broader instability. India, forced to respond, might escalate the situation, giving Pakistan an opportunity to raise the nuclear threat and bring Kashmir back into international focus.
Judging by a speech that Munir gave to overseas Pakistanis in Islamabad on 17th April, he appears to be channeling Gen. Zia-ul-Haq, the architect of the Islamization of the Pakistani Army. Like Zia, Munir shows little regard for the sensitivities of the Kashmiri people; if tourist killings hurt Kashmiris but hurt India more, so be it. Strikes on military targets in Jammu over the past two years had failed to create enough disruption. It was time to escalate.
In the last two years, there has been a tactical shift: highly trained, hardened terrorists capable of guerrilla warfare have been infiltrated. Their ability to strike and move in jungle areas with little or no visibility suggests military-grade training. Their mobility has made intelligence gathering and tracking extremely difficult.
Civilian killings in Dangri (Rajouri) in 2023, the attack on pilgrims in Reasi in 2024, and the killing of workers at Z-Morh this year did not have the intended impact. The calibrated and persistent attempts have continued. However, the attack on pilgrims this time appears to have had some immediate consequences—or has it?
A changed template
For the first time, India has decided to punish the Pakistani state, not just the terror infrastructure. Stopping the waters of the Jhelum and Chenab rivers at crucial times will hurt Pakistan’s economy and populace, especially when their economy is already on the brink. This year’s poor snowfall and the anticipated severe summer will worsen water shortages for both countries, but Pakistan will be more dependent on river waters.
The unimaginable punishment that the Prime Minister has promised will come, second guessing the government doesn’t help nor does orchestrating any belligerence. It is evident from the statements of Pakistani ministers that they are bracing for calibrated Indian responses, recalling the precedents of the Balakot airstrike and surgical strikes. What is clear is that the template has changed: it will not just be terror camps. The perpetrators and their masters will face multiple consequences. One lesson has already been delivered by the people of Kashmir themselves.
This is an opportunity to build a global consensus against Pakistani-sponsored terrorism, as was done during Vajpayee’s time. The international community will advise restraint, and some may heed Pakistan’s nuclear threats. However, it is ironic that while India is expected to show restraint, Pakistan feels emboldened to continue asymmetric warfare, as was evident in Pakistani ministers’ statements. Defence Minister Khawaja Asif has even admitted to doing ‘dirty work’ for the United States, the West and the UK.
The US has supported India on the Pahalgam issue notwithstanding President Donald Trump’sstatement calling both India and Pakistan his friends. China, on the other hand, has paid lip service while condemning the attack, asking for an ‘impartial investigation,’ as if such a thing is possible. The geopolitical environment is favourable to India as the world is fast getting impatient with usage of terrorism as an instrument of state policy.
While responses are being considered, the security system in Jammu and Kashmir must be reworked in light of the changed tactics. The Jammu and Kashmir Police, the Army, and the CRPF must become equally hardened and resilient to meet the challenges posed by these highly trained guerrillas sent by Lashkar-e-Taiba. While seeking them out in the jungles and the mountains, attrition will take place but there are no easy options.
Human intelligence would need to be ramped up, especially penetration of the terrorist organisations. The usage of highly encrypted communication equipment by the terrorists makes technical intelligence more difficult to get; the security establishment must get back to the basics.
Perception management, especially the bogey of false flag operations that Pakistan constantly raises should be countered emphatically. There are people on social media in India accusing the government of creating the incident to win the Bihar elections.
The Pakistanis have maintained a minimum number foreign terrorists so as to keep their coercive power intact and to pre-empt complete capitulation by the local terrorists. The figures for local terrorists given out by the police is 14, the figures for foreign ones are likely to be higher.
Earlier assumptions about local support structures for terrorists need to be reassessed. Though the elaborate eco-system, of sympathisers, couriers, informers, suppliers and harbourers built by them seems to have been dismantled, the revival of using the drug network and radicalised youth,mostly young girls often under-age, needs to be probed deeper. Now that Pakistan’s intentions are known vulnerabilities have increased, and soft targets—not only in J&K but across the country, especially during the upcoming Amarnath Yatra—are at risk.
As the rules have changed, so must the responses.
(NOTE: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author.)
